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10.2870/26061Introduction to the thesis
Globalization is a dragon with one head but many bodies. The word globalization conjures
up an image. But behind that image lie distinct processes that take place at the same time.
Governments decide to what extent and in what way to open up their economy to global
in￿ uences. They interact and negotiate with other governments. Firms decide if and how
they want to enter foreign markets. Or how best to respond to foreign entrants on their
domestic market. Consumers change their choice of products. Workers ￿ ow from declining to
growing sectors.
This thesis aims at analyzing a few of the dragon￿ s bodies, one at a time. The ￿rst chapter
considers government negotiations. It tries to understand what is behind the observed change
in the way that trade liberalization is negotiated. In the run-up to the Second World War
governments around the world implemented highly protectionary trade policies. Tari⁄s and
quotas on imported goods soared. World trade ￿ ows fell sharply, deepening the Great De-
pression. After the War the governments of the United States and several European countries
were resolved to unravel the protectionist net. The General Agreement on Tari⁄s and Trade
(GATT) was born: a forum for reducing international barriers to trade through multilateral
negotiation rounds. The GATT proved to be a highly successful institution, shlashing tari⁄s
and quotas during decades, while its membership kept on growing.
The US government played a key role in the multilateral process, continuously devoting its
e⁄orts and in￿ uence to avert its stagnation. One of the most successful rounds in the history of
the multilateral process was even named after the US president who pushed for its inception:
the Kennedy Round. To underline its commitment to multilateralism, the US government
steered clear of signing any trade agreements outside of GATT. Until the 1980s. During
the Reagan and Bush sr. Administrations a shift in thinking about trade policy took place.
Suddenly, the US government began to actively seek selective bilateral trade partnerships
outside of the multilateral system. This trend continued in the 1990s. But not only did
the US government look for bilateral trade partners, all around the globe so-called Regional
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10.2870/26061Trade Agreements sprang up. The number of such trade agreements tripled between 1980 and
1995, and since 1995 has more than tripled again, approaching 200. This phenomenon has
been dubbed "regionalism". Meanwhile, the multilateral process still managed to conclude
the Uruguay Round in 1992, after a decade of negotiations. GATT subsequently transformed
into the World Trade Organization (WTO). But the WTO has failed to produce a completed
round ever since.
Why the shift? Why move away from a successful multilateral process towards regionalism?
Why in the 1980s? Chapter I suggests a culprit: the rise of global trade imbalances. In
particular, the 1980s witnessed an unprecedented growth of the US trade de￿cit, especially
towards Japan. Such a development can make a government more selective about who to
cooperate with. In a bilateral relationship the de￿cit country has relatively little to gain from
lower tari⁄s on its exports, and relatively much to lose from lowering tari⁄s on its imports.
The reason is its large market power over imported goods, with which it can lower world
demand and world prices of its imported goods when applying tari⁄s. Multilateralism leaves
no choice whom to cooperate with. But if the US opts for a regional route, it can choose
trade partners towards which its de￿cit is relatively small, such as the NAFTA partners in
the 1980s. As multilateralism slows down, other countries, in turn, step onto the regionalist
path themselves.
This simple intuition is formalized using a game and an underlying model. The main
result is that when global imbalances pass certain thresholds, multilateralism grinds to a halt
and regionalism emerges. Moreover, the modelling allows us to go a step beyond the simple
intuition, and analyze the welfare implications of regionalism. In fact, some academics have
argued that the WTO should make it harder for countries to sign Regional Trade Agree-
ments. This, they believe, may boost the multilateral process and help achieve world trade
liberalization at a faster pace. The model in Chapter I shows, however, that the argument is
not so simple. Consider an extreme case in which a law is passed forbidding Regional Trade
Agreements. A country that ￿rst would have opted for regionalism is now faced with a choice
between multilateralism or not cooperating with anyone. When trade imbalances are small
5
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10.2870/26061enough, the policy prohibiting regionalism can push all countries to cooperate multilaterally.
But for su¢ ciently large trade imbalances, the opposite may come about: partial cooperation
is replaced by non-cooperation. As long as trade imbalances are around, therefore, allowing
bilateral trade cooperation can be best for world welfare.
But what happens when large trade imbalances are not around anymore? After all, the
dollar has fallen sharply in recent times. This makes US exports cheaper, decreasing the
trade de￿cit. China has made ￿rst moves towards a more ￿ exible exchange rate policy. If
it allows its currency to appreciate against the dollar, then its exports would become more
expensive, again helping to reduce the US trade de￿cit. If indeed we are moving towards a
world with smaller trade imbalances, should we consequently also expect to see a world with
more multilateralism? The modelling in Chapter I can be adjusted to tackle this question.
In particular, one can construct a dynamic game, in which there is more than one period.
Such a dynamic game yields an interesting result: even temporary trade imbalances can have
a lasting e⁄ect on the structure of trade agreements. The intuition is simple. During times
of large imbalances some countries sign Regional Trade Agreements. These agreements have
the potential to generate rents for the insiders of an agreement over the outsiders (because by
cutting tari⁄s on each other the insiders raise the world prices of their own export goods, at
outsiders￿expense). Temporary imbalances then trigger lasting regionalism.
Chapter II considers another body of the dragon: ￿rm decisions. In particular, it asks how
￿rms￿decisions about entering and exiting markets can explain two empirical regularities.
Firstly, empirical work using ￿rm-level data reports that trade liberalization leads to so-called
￿rm selection. That is, when a country cuts its tari⁄s relatively e¢ cient foreign exporters
enter the domestic market. At the same time, the least e¢ cient domestic ￿rms are forced
to exit. Overall, the average productivity of ￿rms selling to domestic consumers then rises.
Secondly, trade brings a greater variety of products to consumers. Say that initially domestic
producers o⁄er a few types of sports shoes to domestic consumers. When barriers to trade
are reduced, big producers like Nike, Reebok and Adidas come in and consumers have a wider
choice among sports shoes.
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10.2870/26061Separately, for each of these empirical regularities there exists a seminal theory. But, taken
together, they constitute a puzzle. In the main model for ￿rm selection each ￿rm produces only
one variety. That is, Nike may be more cost-e¢ cient than a small domestic shoe producer, but
both o⁄er only one type of sports shoe. Now, the model predicts that when trade barriers are
reduced the total number of ￿rms remaining on the domestic market decreases. Some e¢ cient
foreign ￿rms come in, but even more ine¢ cient domestic ￿rms are pushed out. Since each
￿rm produces only one variety, this means that total variety available to domestic consumers
drops, contrary to what is observed empirically.
But what if ￿rms can produce more than one variety? Nike produces not only one Nike
sports shoe, but many di⁄erent types: Nike Air, Nike Jordan, etcetera. Chapter II presents a
model in which this is the case. Firms di⁄er in productivity and choose how many varieties
they wish to o⁄er. They choose the number of varieties on the basis of a cost-bene￿t analysis.
On the one hand, each additional variety takes away part of consumers￿demand for the
￿rms previous varieties. If Nike markets a new type of sports shoe, its existing types will
be bought less. On the other hand, maintaining a brand is costly. For instance, Nike makes
advertisements that bene￿t sales on all of its shoes. Thus, adding more varieties allows the
￿rm to spread its cost.
The model in Chapter II provides an intuitive mechanism to understand how ￿rm selection
and rising product variety can take place together. Again, like in the standard model, when
barriers to trade are reduced relatively e¢ cient foreign exporters enter the domestic market,
and the least e¢ cient domestic ￿rms are pushed out. Again, fewer ￿rms remain in the market
in total. However, contrary to the standard model, total variety nonetheless always rises. The
reason is that e¢ cient exporters o⁄er more variety than the domestic ￿rms that exit. Thinking
about the sports shoes example once more: Nike, Reebok and Adidas enter a market and
push out more than three small domestic ￿rms. But Nike, Reebok and Adidas each o⁄er more
di⁄erent varieties of sports shoes than the small domestic ￿rms. As it turns out, the model
predicts that this dominates the decrease in the number of ￿rms. Thus, total variety available
to domestic consumers increases.
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10.2870/26061However, does that mean that domestic consumers are always better o⁄ with lower trade
barriers? They like having more varieties to choose from. But they also like having more
di⁄erent brands to choose from. Overall, the destruction of local brands can sometimes make
consumers worse o⁄, despite the increase in variety. Yet, consumers also bene￿t through
an additional channel. The entering foreign ￿rms are more cost-e¢ cient, and therefore have
lower prices than the small domestic ￿rms. On the whole, the model predicts that even when
consumers loose out through the variety channel, they are more than compensated through
the price channel.
Chapter III considers the dragon￿ s body formed by workers. In particular, workers￿expec-
tations about wages. The chapter is motivated by survey studies conducted among college
and university students in several countries. In these studies students are asked what they
expect to earn after graduation, or what they expect the average student in their ￿eld earns
after graduation. The studies then perform empirical regressions that control for a host of
variables, such as gender, educational performance, etcetera. They ￿nd that even when con-
trolling for such factors there is a very wide dispersion of wage expectations among students.
In fact, even when students are asked about the average wage earned by graduates in their
￿eld, they give a wide variety of answers. For instance, take a group of US students. Pick
from them the student whose expectation about the average wage is higher than 90% of his
fellow students. Also pick the student whose expectation is higher than only 10% of his fellow
students. According to the survey studies the wage expectation of the ￿rst student will be
about twice as high as that of the second.
But not only do wage expectations di⁄er greatly among students within a country. The
degree of dispersion di⁄ers strongly between countries. Survey studies in several European
countries indicate that the dispersion of wage expectations among students in Europe is consid-
erably larger than in the US. This is all the more surprising if you consider that the dispersion
of actual wages earned is smaller than in the US. Generally, the greater dispersion of wage
expectations in Europe is thought to be due to the fact that students there have less acurate
information about wages. US students are better informed, through better counselling for
8




But what is the e⁄ect of such dispersion in wage expectations on the job market? Can cross-
country di⁄erences in this dispersion perhaps tell us something about cross-country patterns
in unemployment? Could it be a reason to plead for investments to improve the dissemination
of information about wages, such as through student counselling? Chapter III develops a
model to analyze such questions. Standard models of unemployment assume that everybody
who is looking for a job has the same wage expectation. Instead, the model in Chapter III
allows for di⁄erent wage expectations among unemployed searchers.
The main result that the model yields is that the wider the dispersion of wage expectations
is, the higher we should expect the overall unemployment to be. That is, if in Europe wage
expectations among students are more widely dispersed than in the US, we should expect to
observe more unemployed graduates in Europe. Why? The reason is quite intuitive. Imagine
you are looking for a job. Every morning when you wake up you receive a phone call from
an interested employer. He o⁄ers you a wage. If you expect to earn a lot, you are likely to
decline an employer who does not o⁄er much. Conversely, if you expect to earn little, even
a pretty low wage o⁄er would make you happy, and you accept. So optimists spend a longer
time looking for jobs than pessimists. However, for an optimist there is no upper bound on
how long he may decide to wait for the o⁄er that he accepts. An extremely pessimistic person,
instead, would accept the very next o⁄er made to him. There is a lower bound on the duration
of his search. So there is an asymmetry between overestimating wages and underestimating
them. This assymetry drives the result that when wage expectations become more dispersed
the average time it takes people to ￿nd a job increases.
Finally, Chapter III performs a numerical exercise to get an idea about the size of the e⁄ect
that dispersed wage expectations may have. Using numbers from survey studies conducted
among US and German students an upper bound on potential unemployment reduction can
be computed. That is, how much can US and German unemployment at most be reduced by
better wage information. At most, because the exercise has to assume that everybody in the
labor market knows as little about wages as the students that were surveyed. For the US about
9
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10.2870/260611 in 10 unemployed would have a job if information about wages were perfect, the exercise
predicts. For Germany with its wider dispersion of expectations this ￿gure approaches 1 in
5. Thus, investing in better information about wages may well have a signi￿cant impact on
unemployment, especially in Europe.
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The US Trade De￿cit, the Decline of
the WTO and the Rise of Regionalism
Abstract:
This paper argues that the growing US trade de￿cit has caused the decline of the WTO
and the rise of regional trade agreements. A country in de￿cit prefers to retain market power
against countries with a large surplus. Multilateral cooperation restricts its choice. This
notion is formalized in a three-country game in which countries negotiate multilaterally and,
if that fails, bilaterally. The multilateral agreement only holds for su¢ ciently even trade
balances. When one country￿ s de￿cit grows too large, a regionalist equilibrium emerges.
That regionalism can last, even when imbalances disappear, as RTA insiders earn rents over
outsiders.
Keywords: Regionalism, RTA, Multilateralism, WTO, Trade balance, US trade de￿cit
JEL Classi￿cation: C72, C73, F13, F32
Introduction
Over the past two decades the way countries negotiate trade liberalization has changed remark-
ably. The multilateral process, responsible for the highly successful post-War liberalization
e⁄ort, has slowed down, arguably reaching a standstill at the WTO￿ s Doha Round. At the
same time, trade agreements outside of the multilateral system have grown at an extraordinary
pace. The solid line in Figure 1 depicts the number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)
according to WTO data.1
1This ￿gure includes RTAs on trade in goods (www.wto.org). Note that RTAs are not always regional in
nature (i.e: US-Singapore).
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What has made countries opt for this regional route? In what has become known as the
Bhagwati-hypothesis, Bhagwati (1993, p.29) famously argued that:
"The main driving force for regionalism today is the conversion of the United
States, hitherto an abstaining party [...] The conversion of the United States is
of major signi￿cance. As the key defender of multilateralism through the postwar
years, its decision now to travel the regional route [...] tilts the balance of forces
at the margin away from multilateralism to regionalism."
But what is it that made the US government suddenly change policy? Why did this
happen in the 1980s and why has regionalism persisted ever since? In sum: what is the
economic rationale for the hypothesis proposed by Bhagwati? This paper presents a theory
capable of providing that rationale. Its explanation is based on the rise of trade imbalances.
From the 1980s onwards, we argue, the growing US trade de￿cit has made selective trade
partnerships more attractive for the US government. This has stalled multilateralism and has
made countries around the world pursue the regionalist alternative. The broken line in Figure
1 displays the evolution of the US trade balance.
The basic mechanism is intuitive. When a bilateral trade imbalance is large enough, the
de￿cit country can be better o⁄ under non-cooperation than under bilateral free trade. The
12
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10.2870/26061reason is that a country in de￿cit loses much by giving up independent tari⁄ setting. It has
large market power over its import goods, and hence a strong incentive to depress their prices
using import tari⁄s. At the same time, because a de￿cit country exports relatively little, it
gains less from lower tari⁄s on its exports abroad. Empirical work by Broda et al. (2006) and
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) provides support for the theory that countries set higher tari⁄s on
goods that they have more market power over. Using probit regressions, moreover, both Magee
(2003) and Holmes (2005) ￿nd that a larger bilateral trade imbalance implies a signi￿cantly
smaller probability that two countries form a RTA. For instance, Magee (2003) estimates the
e⁄ect of increasing a country￿ s bilateral trade surplus with another country from zero to ten
percent of total bilateral trade in 1980. He ￿nds that this reduces the probability that the
two countries sign a RTA before 1998 by 3.4%.
Now consider a multi-country setting. If a de￿cit country wants to cooperate at all, it will
prefer to choose a partner towards which its de￿cit is small. It becomes selective. Instead of
proceeding multilaterally, which restricts its choice, it opts for a regional route. We formalize
this intuition in a negotiation game with three countries. One country, X, has a trade de￿cit
against both others, Y and Z, but a larger de￿cit towards Z. One can think of X as the US,
Z as Japan in the 1980s or China nowadays, and Y as the rest of the world. In an appendix
we provide a microfounding model for the game￿ s setting, where trade imbalances come about
through optimal consumption smoothing in response to country-speci￿c income shocks.
Negotiations in the game consist of two stages: multilateral and bilateral. In each stage,
those agreements are signed for which all parties state that they consent. The game is solved
using three properties, which we show can be derived from our microfounding goods market
model: ￿rstly, a country￿ s bene￿t of a RTA increases in the trade surplus towards its partner;
secondly, there is a threshold bilateral trade de￿cit beyond which a country is better o⁄without
a RTA; ￿nally, a RTA between two countries reduces the welfare of the third country.
The game has three equilibria: multilateralism, regionalism and complete non-cooperation.
On the basis of the three properties, we identify a set of restrictions on the size of the bilateral
trade imbalances, which relate to the equilibrium outcome. When all restrictions hold, we say
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10.2870/26061that imbalances are small. When some are violated, imbalances are large. And when none
hold, imbalances are extreme. For extreme imbalances there is complete non-cooperation. For
large imbalances, instead, a regionalist equilibrium emerges with bilateral cooperation between
X ￿Y or Y ￿Z or both. Multilateralism only comes about for small imbalances. Thus, rising
trade imbalances can trigger the move from multilateralism to regionalism. This is the central
result of the paper.
Moreover, the shift to regionalism can be lasting, even if large trade imbalances are not.
We extend the game to a dynamic setting and show that regionalism can have a lock-in e⁄ect.
The reason is that once RTAs have been formed, insiders to the agreements gain rents over
outsiders. These insiders may then not have su¢ cient incentive to proceed multilaterally, even
if trade imbalances disappear over time. Thus, temporary imbalances can trigger a lasting
change in the structure of trade agreements. Translating to current economic conditions, the
large depreciation of the US dollar or a future revaluation of the Chinese renminbi would not
necessarily induce a return to multilateralism.
Nonetheless, the existence of the regionalist option can be valuable to the global econ-
omy. Without it, countries are left with a choice between multilateralism and complete non-
cooperation. We show that for su¢ ciently large trade imbalances, regionalism safeguards
partial cooperation over complete non-cooperation. For more moderate imbalances, on the
other hand, a restricted choice can force the de￿cit country into multilateral cooperation,
raising world welfare.
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents our one-shot game. Sec-
tion 4 derives its welfare implications. Subsequently, section 5 considers the game￿ s dynamic
extension. Finally, section 6 discusses the policy implications of our theory.
14




There exist several alternatives to our explanation of the decline of multilateralism and the
rise of regionalism.2 Krugman (1993) has argued that, ￿rstly, regionalism can go deeper than
multilateralism on non-tari⁄ issues and that, secondly, growing GATT/WTO membership
has aggravated free-rider problems. Both arguments are often heard in policy debates on
regionalism and the WTO (Collier (2006)). Baldwin (1997) has pointed out, however, that
the regionalism of the 80s and 90s was actually primarily concerned with tari⁄ liberalization,
while Ludema (1991) has formally shown that free riding need not undermine multilateralism
when conducted under the Most Favored Nation principle.
Baldwin (1995) o⁄ers a di⁄erent perspective. In his model governments only join a RTA
if the lobbying support of exporters exceeds that of importers. When, exogenously, a single
RTA is signed among two countries, lobbying e⁄orts in other countries tilt favorably towards
supporting RTA. Thus, a single event of regionalism can lead to a domino e⁄ect, which can
explain why existing blocs expand. But the model does not provide a rationale for the initial
choice for regionalism, nor for the slowing of the multilateral process.
Freund (2000a) does model the choice for regionalism. She shows that RTAs become more
attractive when multilateral tari⁄s are low. For high multilateral tari⁄s overall e¢ ciency in-
centives dominate, and non-discriminatory liberalization is best. But for low tari⁄s, incentives
to divert trade through exclusionary RTAs gain importance. Therefore, gradual multilateral
liberalization can lead to growing regionalism. Multilateralism itself remains exogenous, how-
ever.
Our paper also relates to Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Horn et al. (2006). They show, in
di⁄erent settings, that when two countries cooperate on trade policy, times of trade imbalances
should be paired with higher cooperative tari⁄s. This compensates the de￿cit country for the
inability to make use of its market power against the other country.
2Most of the literature on RTAs takes regionalism as given and considers its welfare implications. This
literature is too extensive to review here. We refer to Winters (1996), Bhagwati et al. (1998), Panagariya
(2000) and Baldwin (2005) for surveys.
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The way trade imbalances a⁄ect regionalism is best understood in a simple one-shot game.
There are three players, namely countries X, Y and Z. These countries di⁄er in their bilateral
trade balances towards each other. We let TBij (￿) denote the bilateral trade balance of
country i with country j when the set of agreements ￿ is in force (speci￿ed below). Here,
clearly, one country￿ s bilateral surplus is the other￿ s bilateral de￿cit, TBij (￿) = ￿TBji (￿),




j TBij (￿) = 0.
We obtain a simple analytical setting by ranking countries on the basis of their initial
trade balances. That is, their trade balances in the absence of any agreements, ￿ = f;g.
In particular, we let X be the de￿cit country, Y the middle country and Z the surplus
country. Country X is in de￿cit against both others, but with a larger de￿cit against Z:
TBXZ (￿)j￿=f;g < TBXY (￿)j￿=f;g < 0. And country Z in surplus against both others, with
a larger surplus against X: TBXZ (￿)j￿=f;g < TBY Z (￿)j￿=f;g < 0. In Appendix B we present
a goods market model that provides microfoundations for the setting we assume here. This
microfounding model is based on two periods. In it, the game described below takes place in
the second period, against given trade imbalances, which are generated through ￿rst-period
income shocks.
Countries X, Y and Z play the trade negotiation game depicted in Figure 2. Thus,
negotiations take the form of a statement game. First, each country announces whether it
accepts or rejects the Multilateral Trade Agreement (MTA). When all accept it, the MTA is
signed. But if any country rejects it, the MTA fails and RTA negotiations begin. Regionalism is
thus modelled as the outside option to multilateralism. Likewise, during RTA negotiations only
those agreements are signed on which there is mutual consent. As a tie-breaking assumption,
countries accept an agreement towards which they are indi⁄erent. We denote the RTA between
countries i and j by RTAij. Overall, at the end of negotiations the set of agreement, ￿, can
include either the MTA, or any of RTAXY, RTAXZ, RTAY Z, or it can remain the empty set
16
















Towards MTA/RTA partners: zero tariffs
Towards others: unrestricted tariff setting
After negotiations have been completed, tari⁄s are set. Countries implement zero tar-
i⁄s against their MTA/RTA partners. We assume that countries commit themselves to the
agreements that they sign during negotiations, and cannot subsequently defect from them.4
However, an agreement between two countries imposes no constraints on their policies towards
the third country.5
Thus, we have de￿ned the game￿ s players and their actions. Finally, we assume that
governments are social welfare maximizers, and de￿ne three properties concerning the way
that trade agreements and trade balances a⁄ect a country￿ s welfare. Our microfounding model
in Appendix B shows that these properties can be formally derived from a general speci￿cation
3Saggi and Yildiz (2006) and Zissimos (forthcoming) also model RTA negotiations as a statement game.
For an alternative approach, in which a lead country decides whom to o⁄er an agreement to, see Aghion et al.
(2007).
4In the literature on RTAs there are two strands regarding commitment. One which, like us, assumes
the ability to commit (see Krishna (1998) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999)), and another which requires
agreements to be self-enforcing mechanisms (see Riezman (1991)). The commitment strand considers that,
in reality, deviation from trade agreements can give only a very short-lived bene￿t to the defector, if any.
Generally, trade measures are quickly observable to other countries. In fact, in our game one period equals
one multilateral negotiation round. Such rounds can be more than a decade apart. Deviation pro￿t would
constitute only a fraction of the "period" income, therefore.
5That is, say, X ￿ Y RTA does not impose any constraints on either X or Y ￿ s indepedent tari⁄ setting
against Z. In our game RTAs are Free Trade Areas (FTAs), therefore, as opposed to Customs Unions. In the
latter members set a common external tari⁄. In reality 84% of all RTAs are FTAs (Crawford and Fiorentino
(2005)).
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10.2870/26061with maximizing agents. Below we brie￿ y explain the intuition behind each property.
P1 A country￿ s net bene￿t of having a bilateral agreement with another country is increasing
in the trade surplus towards it:
@
@ TBij (￿)jRTAij = 2￿
h
WijRTAij2￿ ￿ WijRTAij = 2￿
i
> 0
where Wi is country i￿ s sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenues.
P2 For a given set of agreements (￿) that does not include RTAij (RTAij = 2 ￿) there exists
a threshold bilateral trade de￿cit, TBij < 0, below which country i is better o⁄ not
signing RTAij. That is, country i￿ s net bene￿t of the RTA is zero at the threshold:
WijRTAij2￿ ￿ WijRTAij = 2￿ = 0 () TBij (￿)jRTAij = 2￿ = TBij
P3 Two insiders to a RTA impose a negative externality on the outsider￿ s welfare:
WijRTAj6=i2￿ ￿ WijRTAj6=i= 2￿ < 0
and worsen the outsider￿ s trade balance:
TBijjRTAj6=i2￿ ￿ TBijjRTAj6=i= 2￿ < 0
Intuitively, the de￿cit country has more market power over its imports from the surplus
country than vice versa. Thus, giving up the ability to in￿ uence the prices of import goods is
more costly for the de￿cit country, which is the ￿rst property. This gives rise to a trade-o⁄
between the e¢ ciency gains of mutual tax elimination and the cost of yielding unrestricted
tari⁄ setting. Under balanced trade the bilateral trade agreement is always mutually bene-
￿cial. But beyond a threshold bilateral imbalance, the de￿cit country is better o⁄ without
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stems from the fact that the two insiders to a RTA raise the demand for, and thereby the
prices of, each other￿ s export goods. Hence, the outsider country pays more for its imports
from them, which lowers its welfare and reduces its bilateral trade balances.7
Taken together, properties P1-P3 are su¢ cient to solve the game depicted in Figure 2
(proof in Appendix A):
Proposition I.1 There are three types of Nash Equilibria: multilateralism (￿ = fMTAg),
regionalism (￿ = fRTAXYg, ￿ = fRTAY Zg or ￿ = fRTAXY;RTAY Zg), and complete
non-cooperation (￿ = f;g).
1. Multilateralism obtains when trade imbalances are small enough that TBXY (￿)j￿=fRTAY Zg ￿
TBXY and TBXZ (￿)j￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg ￿ TBXZ hold.
2. Regionalism comes about when trade imbalances are su¢ ciently large that at least one of
the above conditions is violated, but not so large that for all i with TBij < 0 it holds
that TBij (￿) < TBij8￿.
3. When for all i with TBij < 0 it holds that TBij (￿) < TBij8￿, then there is complete
non-cooperation.
This is the central result of the paper. When trade imbalances are small enough, multi-
lateral cooperation is feasible. But when they become too large, the de￿cit country prefers
to choose its partner selectively. This country￿ s decision to opt out of multilateralism subse-
quently gives rise to worldwide regionalism.
6This resembles Kennan and Riezman￿ s (1988) result that a big country can win a trade war against a
small country.
7The price e⁄ect of a RTA on outsiders is empirically documented by Chang and Winters (2002) for the
case of MERCOSUR.
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But does this mean that world welfare is reduced by the existence of the regionalist option?
Would our theory plead for rules that make it harder for countries to form Regional Trade
Agreements? Suggestions to strengthen GATT Article XXIV, which formulates the conditions
allowing WTO members to join RTAs, have been heard in academic policy debates (see the
discussion in section 6).
Assume, as is standard in international trade theory, that world welfare is largest under
world free trade. The welfare e⁄ect of regionalism then depends on the size of trade imbalances.
For moderate imbalances regionalism is damaging. Consider the case where X loses a little
from cooperating with Z, but gains much from a RTA with Y . Then, if X has the regionalist
alternative, it rejects world free trade. But given the large gains from RTAXY, X prefers
the MTA to complete non-cooperation. That is: restricting X￿ s choice to multilateralism or
complete non-cooperation, it opts for multilateralism.
Now consider the opposite: X has a large trade de￿cit towards Z and gains much from
retaining independent tari⁄ setting against it, while X is indi⁄erent towards a RTA with Y .
When X is faced with the choice between multilateralism and non-cooperation only, it chooses
non-cooperation. In this case, regionalism safeguards partial free trade.8 Formally (proof in
Appendix A):
Proposition I.2 Consider a No-Regionalism Game, in which rejection of the MTA implies
complete non-cooperation, ￿ = f;g.
1. Whenever WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg > WXj￿=fMTAg ￿ WXj￿=f;g multilateralism holds in the
No-Regionalism Game but not in the standard Game.
2. Whenever WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg ￿ WXj￿=f;g > WXj￿=fMTAg complete non-cooperation
comes about in the No-Regionalism Game but not in the standard Game.
8Absent trade diversion (as in our microfoundations), partial cooperation is certainly better for world
welfare than non-cooperation.
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The ￿rst best solution would be the elimination of imbalances, or the establishment of a system
of international transfers. When this is impossible, regionalism can sometimes be a second
best solution.
Dynamic extension
So far we have considered only a one-shot game. But trade balances are constantly changing.
In 2007 and throughout the ￿rst quarter of 2008 the dollar depreciated sharply against the
euro. At the same time, the Chinese government has allowed a ￿rst modest appreciation of
its currency. The US trade de￿cit has begun to decrease. If global trade imbalances continue
to decline, should we also expect to observe a rekindling of multilateralism and a decline of
regionalism? That is, do the predictions of the static model carry through to a dynamic setting
without modi￿cation?
To analyze this question we extend last section￿ s game to a dynamic setting. Each period
is a precise repetition of the one-shot game in Figure 2, except that negotiations only take
place about agreements that have not previously been signed. Moreover, if a MTA is signed,
it supplants any existing RTAs. Governments discount future periods at a rate ￿ 2 [0;1].
The evolution of trade imbalances is as follows. In the ￿rst period of the game trade
imbalances are as in the basic game. Afterwards, there is balanced trade forever. This is a
simple dynamic setting, but will already allow us to derive quite rich results. Note that the
assumption of in￿nite periods is of importance. We come back to this below. Furthermore,
the dynamic game can be microfounded using precisely the same model as the basic game.
One need only add the requirement that all period 0 debt (the pre-game period, see Appendix
B) is repaid in period 1.
We solve the game by considering ￿rst the decisions taken in the limit for di⁄erent struc-
tures of previously signed agreements. The decisions in the ￿rst period can then be derived
by backward induction. The outcome is as follows (proof in Appendix A):
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forever; permanent regionalism (one RTA forever); temporary regionalism (one or two RTAs
in the ￿rst period and multilateralism from the second period onwards). We call these the
Good, the Bad and the Ugly Paths, respectively:
1. If for t > 1,
h
W t
ij￿=fRTAijg ￿ W t
ij￿=fMTAg
i
￿ 0 then for small ￿rst period imbalances (as
in point 1 of Proposition 1) the Good Path obtains, and otherwise the Ugly Path.
2. If t > 1,
h
W t
ij￿=fRTAijg ￿ W t
ij￿=fMTAg
i
> 0 then there exists a value ￿ of the discount
rate such that for ￿ ￿ ￿ all three paths are possible, and for ￿ < ￿ paths are as in (1).
Here, W t
ij￿=fRTAijg > W t
ij￿=fMTAg means that even under balanced trade (t > 1) a country
is better o⁄ being the insider to the only RTA than being in a MTA. Notice that properties
P1-P3 do not exclude this possibility. Intuitively, RTA insiders can gain rents by improving
each other￿ s terms-of-trade at the outsider￿ s expense. The MTA destroys such rents.
What is surprising in Proposition 3 is the presence of the Bad Path. Temporary trade
imbalances can cause permanent regionalism. That is, trade imbalances can a⁄ect the struc-
ture of trade agreements in a persistent, hysteretic manner. The reason is that regionalism
creates rents for insiders. Thus, with regionalism in place, insiders may not participate to a
multilateral agreement that they would otherwise have joined.
More precisely, when there is only one RTA and trade is balanced, RTA insiders face a
trade-o⁄. On the one hand, an insider has the incentive to sign an agreement with the excluded
country. In this manner, it would become the insider on two RTAs and gain instantaneous
welfare. On the other hand, it knows that the next period, the outsiders to the two respective
agreements will be better o⁄ signing the last RTA and achieving world free trade. Due to the
size of RTA rents, world free trade is worse for the insider than one RTA. When patience is
high enough, future losses outweigh instantaneous gains, and regionalism that was triggered
by temporary imbalances may perpetuate.
22




Our theory relates the policy debate on global trade imbalances to the policy debate on the
WTO. Until now these have been largely separate. If anything, some policy makers have
suggested a role for the WTO in helping to bring down global imbalances (Dodge (2005), De
Rato (2005)). Our work indicates the possible importance of the opposite channel: limiting
imbalances to garner incentives for faster trade liberalization. The dynamic game shows that
reducing imbalances may, at times, strengthen multilateralism. But, as it shows as well, this
will not work if vested interests in existing RTAs are too large.
Our theory also relates to the policy question whether GATT Article XXIV should be
strengthened. This Article governs the exception to non-discriminatory (multilateral) liberal-
ization granted to RTAs. Proponents of strengthening this Article (Bhagwati (1993)) argue
that larger barriers to RTA formation could aid world trade liberalization through the mul-
tilateral process. The result derived in section 4 cautions against such a move. In a world
of large trade imbalances tougher rules on regionalism can end up pushing countries towards
less, not more, trade cooperation.
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Trade Liberalization, Firm Selection
and Variety Growth
Abstract
Recent empirical ￿ndings indicate that when trade is liberalized both ￿rm selection takes
place and product variety increases. Each of these two stylized facts has its own seminal
theory. But how can they arise together? This paper presents a model of heterogeneous,
multi-variety ￿rms that provides an intuitive explanation. When trade is liberalized e¢ cient
foreign exporters enter and push out the least e¢ cient domestic ￿rms. Fewer ￿rms remain
in total. But exporters endogenously o⁄er more variety than domestic ￿rms. The entry of
variety-rich foreign ￿rms unambiguously dominates the decrease in the number of ￿rms. Thus,
total variety increases.
Keywords: Trade, Heterogeneous ￿rms, Variety, Firm selection, Market concentration.
JEL Classi￿cation: F12, F15, L11
Introduction
According to Feenstra (2006) ￿rm selection and rising product variety are the two key empirical
regularities that emerge from recent microeconometric work in international trade. Firstly,
when barriers to trade are lowered, e¢ cient foreign exporters enter the domestic market and
push out the least e¢ cient domestic ￿rms (Tybout (2003), Greenaway and Kneller (2007)).
This is known as ￿rm selection. Firm selection raises the average productivity of the ￿rms
that are active on the domestic market. Secondly, opening up the domestic market broadens
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10.2870/26061the available choice of product varieties, to the bene￿t of domestic consumers (Broda and
Weinstein (2006)).
For each of these stylized facts there exists a seminal theory: Melitz (2003) for ￿rm selection
and Krugman (1980) for product variety. But how are the two connected? The purpose of
this paper is to present an intuitive mechanism that links the two stylized facts. When
trade is liberalized, ￿rm selection leaves a market with fewer, larger ￿rms. But exporters
endogenously o⁄er more variety than purely domestic ￿rms. Upon liberalization, the e¢ cient
foreign exporters that enter the domestic market are more variety-rich than those domestic
￿rms that are pushed out. This more than compensates for the fact that fewer ￿rms remain.
Thus, total variety increases.
The model is based on the contributions of Melitz (2003) and Allanson and Montagna
(2005). In the Melitz-model ￿rms produce a single horizontally di⁄erentiated variety and
di⁄er in their productivity. Exporting involves a sunk cost, which leads to a scale ranking:
only the most productive ￿rms export. Allanson and Montagna (2005), instead, present a
closed-economy model of multi-variety ￿rms. They work with a nested CES, in which the
varieties of a single ￿rm are closer substitutes than the varieties of di⁄erent ￿rms. This
bounds a ￿rm￿ s optimal variety, because additional varieties cannibalize on the demand for
the ￿rm￿ s existing line.
Bringing these together, we obtain a model of international trade with heterogeneous,
multi-variety ￿rms. We assume that a ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency parameter is applicable to all its va-
rieties. That is, we abstract from e¢ ciency di⁄erences within a ￿rm. This allows us to
parameterize the productivity distribution and obtain a closed-form solution. As is com-
mon in both the theoretical and the empirical literature on ￿rm heterogeneity, we apply a
Pareto distribution (Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Baldwin and Forslid (2006), Helpman et al.
(2004)).
As proven by Baldwin and Forslid (2006), applying a Pareto distribution in the standard
Melitz-model leads it to predict that trade liberalization reduces the total number of ￿rms that
sell to domestic consumers. Market concentration rises. This property of the model not only
27
Agur, Itai (2008), Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26061seems fairly intuitive, but is also consistent with Mirza￿ s (2006) empirical work.9 However,
given that it is a single-variety model, fewer ￿rms necessarily imply less variety.
In our multi-variety setting, instead, trade liberalization always increases total variety
available to domestic consumers. The mechanism comes about because more productive ￿rms
choose to o⁄er more variety. The reason is the presence of a ￿rm-wide ￿xed cost. This
generates an economy of scope, which is stronger for ￿rms that have a lower marginal cost
per variety. As only the most productive ￿rms self-select into export, exporters o⁄er more
variety than purely domestic ￿rms. Firm selection still leaves a more concentrated market.
But, quite remarkably, the variety gap between entering exporters and exiting domestic ￿rms
unambiguously dominates. Thus, ￿rm heterogeneity in productivity is the driving force behind
both ￿rm selection and variety growth.
However, the welfare implications of our model are less straightforward than those in a
model with single-variety ￿rms. Consumers value more variety. But due to the di⁄erence
between the intra-￿rm and inter-￿rm elasticities of substitution, they also value being able
to buy from di⁄erent ￿rms. We prove that, on the whole, consumers sometimes prefer the
variety o⁄ering they could choose from before trade was liberalized. Gains from lower prices
always more than compensate in this case, though.
Our work also relates to that of Bernard et al. (2006), Eckel and Neary (2005) and Nocke
and Yeaple (2007) on multi-product ￿rms in trade. The latter develop a model with ￿rms that
di⁄er in organizational capability, while overall productivity declines in the number of product
categories that ￿rms choose to be active in. The model explains why larger ￿rms have lower
market-to-book values. In Bernard et al. (2006) ￿rms are heterogeneous in both managerial
ability and expertise in each product category. Trade liberalization results in higher average
productivity due to not only ￿rm selection, but also product selection within ￿rms. Eckel
and Neary (2005) consider trade with homogeneous multi-product ￿rms under oligopolistic
competition. Optimal variety o⁄ering depends on both core competencies (increasing marginal
9It should be noted, however, that Mirza￿ s (2006) study is based on an oligopolistic market structure, not
a monopolistically competitive one.
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the ￿rm￿ s existing line). These three models have richer structures than our own. For this
reason, they cannot be parameterized with a single distribution to obtain a simple mechanism
that matches the stylized facts described above.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 computes the equilibrium solution, from
which section 4 derives the results. Finally, section 5 considers the welfare implications.
Model
In this section we present our model. We ￿rst describe demand and then the decision problem
that ￿rms face. At the end of the section we demonstrate how the presented model nests the
models of Melitz (2003) and Allanson and Montagna (2005).
Demand
Preferences are given by a nested CES, in which the domestic representative consumer op-
timizes over three stages. In the ￿rst stage, the consumer optimally allocates expenditure,
E, between the quantity index of a di⁄erentiated good q (de￿ned below), and an outside
composite good, z, which is used as a numeraire. We assume that the numeraire good is
produced with identical constant returns to scale technology everywhere and is freely traded.
This is a common assumption (Helpman et al. 2004), which brings about international wage




with ￿ 2 (0;1). By optimization, the consumer spends y = (1 ￿ ￿)E on q, so that we can
write the consumer￿ s budget constraint for the di⁄erentiated good as
y = pq (2)
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where qik is the demand for each variety k of a given ￿rm i, which produces a number (=mass)
hi of varieties. Then, qi is the quantity index associated with the sales of a given ￿rm, while
n is the number of ￿rms. Importantly, ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent
varieties of a given ￿rm and ￿ is the inter-￿rm elasticity of substitution. We assume that
￿ > ￿ > 1.
It is well-known that minimizing expenditure subject to the CES aggregator gives the
following solutions for the welfare-based price indices (see Allanson and Montagna (2005) and



































The ￿rm￿ s problem consists of an entry stage and, subsequently, for as many periods as it
stays active, sales decisions. To start operating ￿rms have to pay a one-time cost Fe, which
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network. Only after incurring this cost, do ￿rms discover their productivity. Firms draw
their productivity, ’, from a time-invariant distribution, g (’). This is an essential building
block of model of Melitz (2003), based on empirical evidence that ￿rms di⁄er widely in their
productivities, even within narrowly de￿ned industries.10
Once ￿rms know their productivity, they must decide whether to produce or to exit.
Those who stay set their prices and variety o⁄ering. However, each period active ￿rms face
an exogenous probability, ￿, of being hit by a death shock. These industry dynamics of the
Melitz-model are essentially a simpli￿ed version of Hopenhayn￿ s (1992) work on endogenous
entry, exit, and long-run stationary equilibria.
Being active on the domestic market brings about the following costs each period:






where a and b are ￿rm-wide and variety-speci￿c ￿xed costs, respectively. These represent,
for instance, advertisement, management time and maintenance of the distribution network.
They are the ￿xed costs required to maintain activity on the domestic market. Both are
necessary elements of the model: a generates increasing returns to scale, while a positive b,
in conjunction with ￿ > ￿, keeps optimal variety bounded. That is, the marginal bene￿t of
variety is decreasing due to ￿ > ￿, while its marginal cost is constant and positive.
Distinct from these is fh, which is the cost of creating a new variety. Once we introduce
exports, it will be clear why these must be kept distinct. In fact, it costs Fh to set up a new
variety. But ￿rms are indi⁄erent between paying this Fh up front, or paying the amortized
￿xed cost ￿Fh = fh each period.11 The last term in the equation captures the variable costs
of production. Here, marginal costs are inversely proportional to the productivity parameter,
’, and w is the wage. We normalize w = 1.
10See the surveys of Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Tybout (2003).
11See the discussion in Melitz (2003, p.1708) on rewriting ￿xed costs to per-period notation.
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an exporter, how many of its varieties to export, and which prices to charge abroad. Yet,
in order to export, ￿rms face an additional hurdle. As in Melitz (2003), they must pay a
so-called beachhead cost, fx, associated to setting up a new trade line.12 For simplicity, we let
the ￿xed costs of maintaining activity on a market, a and b, be the same in the domestic and
foreign markets. To export a good, furthermore, a ￿rm pays tari⁄ and transport costs ￿ > 1





























where the second term in the max operator represents the pro￿ts from exporting. If these are
smaller than zero, the ￿rm will not export. The terms hX
i , pX
ik and qX
ik stand for, respectively,
the number of varieties exported, the price of variety k charged in the foreign market and
the quantity of variety k sold abroad. Countries are identical and the trading cost ￿ is the
same to each destination.13 In the above equation, it is implicit that ￿rms do not develop
new varieties only for export. That is, hi ￿ hX
i , and ￿rms export a subset of their domestic
varieties. Equation (13) below states the required parameter restriction for this to hold. This
condition is necessary for an interior solution.
The ￿rst stage decision of the ￿rm can now be summarized by a free-entry condition:
E [maxf[￿i (’)];0g] ￿ fe (10)
where we have rewritten ￿Fe = fe. Firms will enter as long as the expected net present value
of positive future pro￿ts covers the entry cost. After having drawn ’, moreover, ￿rms have
a cuto⁄ productivity level, b ’, for which they are indi⁄erent between continuing and ceasing
12Tybout (2003) discusses the empirical relevance of these ￿xed costs to commence export.
13It then makes no di⁄erence whether the model is termed a 2-country or a multi-country model: if a ￿rm
exports to any destination, then it exports to all.
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￿i (b ’) = 0 (11)
Similarly, the model contains a cuto⁄productivity for exporting, b ’
X, which is the productivity














ikdk ￿ (a + fx) ￿ bh
X
i = 0 (12)
As in Melitz (2003), however, we require a condition that ensures b ’







After all, the fact that only the most productive fraction of active ￿rms become exporters is
the driving force of ￿rm selection. The above condition is also necessary and su¢ cient for
hi ￿ hX
i . This is veri￿able in the next section.
Finally, if we set ￿ = ￿ and ￿x hi = hX
i = 1 we obtain a model with heterogeneous,
single-variety ￿rms that is equivalent to Melitz￿ s. An alternative way to put it is that in the
standard Melitz-model fh = 0 for hi 2 [0;1] and fh ! 1 for hi > 1: the R&D cost function is
discontinuous at one variety. In addition, the model presented above nests the contribution of
Allanson and Montagna (2005). Their closed-economy model of homogeneous, multi-variety
￿rms is obtained by ￿xing ’ = ’ for all ￿rms and taking away ￿rms￿possibility to export.
Equilibrium
In this section we compute a closed-form equilibrium solution for the Pareto distribution. As
discussed in the introduction, this is a common parameterization, both in theoretical and
quantitative work on ￿rm heterogeneity.
To solve for the price setting of the ￿rms, we replace qik from equation (7) into equation
(9) and set
@￿i(’)












q - where pX
i is the price
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= 0 to obtain prices
charged by exporters. Subsequently,
@￿i(’)




= 0 give us equations for hi and hX
i .
It should be noted that in solving for ￿rms￿decisions on pricing and variety o⁄ering we have
ruled out strategic interactions. This follows Allanson and Montagna￿ s (2005) approach in
extending the standard single-variety per ￿rm Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model
to the multi-variety case.
Replacing terms, equations (11) and (12) provide solutions for the cuto⁄productivity levels
for activity on the domestic and foreign markets, b ’ and b ’
X. To solve for the ￿rms￿free-entry
condition in equation (10), we rewrite the max operators in the pro￿t function to probabilistic
terms. That is, with the probability that ’ ￿ b ’ the ￿rm will remain active in the domestic
market after discovering its productivity. This probability is simply
R 1
b ’ g (’)d’. Similarly,
before entering the market, the ￿rm has a chance of
R 1
b ’X g (’)d’ of becoming an exporter.


































where g (’ j ’ ￿ b ’) is the conditional distribution of ’. That is, the distribution of produc-
tivities among only active ￿rms. While g
￿
’ j ’ ￿ b ’
X￿
is that distribution among exporters.
Furthermore, nX is the number of foreign ￿rms from which domestic consumers purchase. By




b ’X g (’)d’
R 1
b ’ g (’)d’
(15)
This gives us enough to solve the free-entry condition and obtain an equation for n. For the
Pareto distribution, the probability density function takes the form
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smaller c implies a wider distribution and, thus, a more heterogeneous population of ￿rms.
As is common in the literature, we normalize d = 1. Moreover, as in Helpman et al. (2004)








to ensure ￿nite variance of the distribution of productivity draws g (’) and the conditional
productivity distribution of active ￿rms g (’ j ’ ￿ b ’). If this condition is violated, productiv-
ity cuto⁄s are indeterminate. Implementing the Pareto distribution and solving algebraically,
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to make things visually easier to absorb. Moreover, for a given ￿rm with productivity draw
’ we also have the following equations governing price setting and the optimal scope at home
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It is interesting to observe here that the inter-￿rm elasticity of substitution, ￿, does not a⁄ect
price setting. Rather, ￿rms set markups purely according to their intra-￿rm elasticity, ￿, and
adjust for ￿ completely along the variety margin.
Results
As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of our model is to explain how trade liberalization
simultaneously leads to an increase in the average industry productivity and variety growth.
With our closed-form solution in hand, we can now show that the model indeed matches these
stylized facts, and observe the mechanism through which it does so.
The way that trade liberalization raises the average productivity of the ￿rms that are
active in an industry, is identical to the Melitz-model: ￿rm selection. The least e¢ cient ￿rms






@￿ = (￿)(+) < 0. Hence,
a tari⁄ reduction raises the productivity cuto⁄, b ’, and the average remaining ￿rm is more
productive.
Moreover, our equilibrium solution allows us to derive a closed-form expression for the
number of ￿rms that are active on the domestic market:
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￿2 > 0 (30)
from which:
Proposition II.1 The number of ￿rms that sell to consumers on the domestic market unam-
biguously decreases when trade is liberalized: @N
@￿ > 0.
Finally, we can obtain a similar expression for the total variety available to domestic
consumers. In general form:
H = n
R 1






’ j ’ ￿ b ’
X￿
d’ (31)
That is, total variety is the sum of the variety o⁄ered by domestic ￿rms and the variety
o⁄ered by foreign ￿rms. The former equals the number of domestic ￿rms times the average
amount of variety per domestic ￿rm. Likewise, the latter equals the number of foreign ￿rms
on the domestic market times the average amount of variety that such ￿rms o⁄er to domestic
consumers.









































￿2 < 0 (33)
so that:
Proposition II.2 Total variety available to domestic consumers unambiguously rises when
trade is liberalized: @H
@￿ < 0.
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i j ’ = b ’
X￿
> [hi j ’ = b ’] by equations (27) and (28). This unambiguously
dominates the decrease in the number of ￿rms. In this manner, both market concentration
and total variety increase.
The result on variety growth is quite surprising when one considers that, due to trade
costs, ￿rms export only a part of their domestic varieties (hX
i < hi). Hence, the productivity
gap between the marginal foreign entrant and the marginal exiting domestic ￿rm (b ’
X ￿ b ’) is
large enough to overcome the e⁄ect of the trade costs: the foreign entrant always o⁄ers more
variety to domestic consumers than the exiting domestic ￿rm
￿￿
hX
i j ’ = b ’
X￿
> [hi j ’ = b ’]
￿
.
And, in turn, this di⁄erence is large enough to more than compensate for variety lost from
the decrease in the number of ￿rms.
Welfare implications
On the whole, consumers always gain from trade liberalization in our model. From our closed-








@￿ = (￿)(￿)(￿) < 0 and total welfare unambigu-
ously increases in liberalization.
However, these welfare gains come about through both prices and variety. We have seen
that trade liberalization gives consumers the choice between more varieties, but from fewer
￿rms. Thus, the question remains whether consumers prefer the available choice after liber-
alization to that before. After all, by ￿ > ￿ consumers care about how many ￿rms they can
buy from. We ask, therefore, whether the variety e⁄ect of trade liberalization is positive in
welfare terms.
Proposition II.3 There exist parameterizations for which the variety e⁄ect of trade liberal-
ization is positive in welfare terms. There also exist parameterizations for which it is negative.
Proof. It su¢ ces to consider the cases fx ! 0 and fh ! 0 (neither of which violates the
condition in equation (13)). When entry costs to export vanish, fx ! 0, all ￿rms export at least
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@￿ ! 0 from equations (29) and (30). But by equation (33) @H
@￿ , does not go to zero,
since exporters expand their variety o⁄ering when tari⁄s are lower,
@hX
i
@￿ < 0 (equation (28)).
More variety with the same number of ￿rms implies an unambiguous welfare gain. Conversely,







b so that @H
@￿ ! 0. At the same time, @N
@￿ does not go to zero. The same amount
of variety from fewer ￿rms implies an unambiguous welfare loss.
Overall, therefore, the outcomes of our model are straightforward in the nominal sense
(i.e., fewer ￿rms, more variety), but more intricate when it comes to consumers￿welfare. Yet,
even when the variety e⁄ect of trade liberalization is negative in welfare terms, lower prices
more than compensate the consumer.
39




[1] Allanson, P., and Montagna, C. (2005) Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure: An
Explorative Application to the Product Life Cycle. International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization 23: 587-597.
[2] Baldwin, R.E., and Forslid, R. (2006) Trade Liberalization with Heterogeneous Firms.
NBER Working Paper No. 12192.
[3] Bernard, A.B., Redding, S., and Schott, P.K. (2006) Multi-Product Firms and Trade
Liberalization. NBER Working Paper No. 12782.
[4] Broda, C., and Weinstein, D.E. (2006) Globalization and the Gains from Variety. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 121: 541-585.
[5] Chaney, T. (forthcoming) Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms, Market Structure and
the Geography of International Trade. American Economic Review.
[6] Eckel, C., and Neary, P.J. (2005) Multi-Product Firms and Flexible Manufacturing in the
Global Economy. Working Paper.
[7] Feenstra, R.C. (2006) New Evidence on the Gains from Trade. Review of World Economics
142: 617-641.
[8] Greenaway, D., and Kneller, R. (2007) Firm Heterogeneity, Exporting and Foreign Direct
Investment. The Economic Journal 117: F135-F161.
[9] Helpman, E., Melitz, M., and Yeaple, S.R. (2004) Exports versus FDI with Heterogeneous
Firms. American Economic Review 94: 300-316.
[10] Hopenhayn, H.A. (1992) Entry, Exit and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium.
Econometrica 60: 1127-1150.
[11] Krugman, P. (1980) Scale Economies, Product Di⁄erentiation, and the Pattern of Trade.
American Economic Review 70: 950-959.
[12] Melitz, M. (2003) The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity. Econometrica 71: 1695-1727.
[13] Melitz, M., and Ottaviano, G.I.P. (2008) Market Size, Trade and Productivity. Review of
Economic Studies 75: 295-316.
[14] Mirza, D. (2006) How Much Does Trade Contribute to Market Structure? Economica
73: 59-74.
[15] Nocke, V., and Yeaple, S.R. (2007) Globalization and Endogenous Firm Scope. Working
Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
40
Agur, Itai (2008), Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26061[16] Obstfeld, M., and Rogo⁄, K.S. (1996) Foundations of International Macroeconomics.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[17] Tybout, J. (2003) Plant and Firm-Level Evidence on ￿ New￿Trade Theories. In: Choi,
E.K., and Harrigan, J. (Eds.), Handbook of International Economics. Oxford: Basil-
Blackwell.
41




How Do Heterogeneous Wage
Expectations A⁄ect Unemployment?
Abstract
Models of unemployment assume that searchers have identical wage expectations. But a
strand of survey studies ￿nds that wage expectations are widely dispersed. This paper presents
the ￿rst model of search with heterogeneous expectations. The model is calibrated on US and
German data. For relevant parameter values, unemployment rises in the dispersion of wage
expectations. Intuitively, there is an underlying convexity: pessimists have a lower bound
on their search duration (one period), whereas optimists do not. For conservative parameter
values, 1 in 10 US unemployed is jobless because of the dispersion of wage expectations. Better
wage information can thus help reduce unemployment.
Keywords: Search, Wage expectations, Heterogeneous expectations, Unemployment
JEL Classi￿cation: D83, D84, J30, J64
Introduction
Unemployment theory is grounded upon models in which searchers have identical wage ex-
pectations. Yet, empirical evidence from an expanding body of survey studies questions this
assumption. These surveys, mostly conducted among college students, ￿nd that wage expecta-
tions are very heterogeneous. Betts (1996), for instance, compares college students￿estimates
of national average salaries in their own ￿elds with the actual salaries. The median student
has roughly zero error, but, ranked by their estimate of the national average salary, the 90th
percentile of respondents foresees wages twice as high as the 10th percentile. Dominitz and
42
Agur, Itai (2008), Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26061Manski (1996) have almost the same result as Betts for national averages, but also ask students
about their own wage expectations, controlling for factors such as age, gender and education.
They ￿nd a close correspondence between overestimating national average wages and high
personal wage expectations. In a similar survey, Brunello et al. (2001) ￿nd that for most
European countries wage expectations are even more widely dispersed than in the US.14
This paper considers how such heterogeneity in wage expectations a⁄ects the labour mar-
ket. In particular, we investigate the e⁄ect of dispersion in wage expectations on unemploy-
ment. We start from a basic job search model, in which searchers receive a wage o⁄er each
period and follow an optimal reservation wage strategy. Those who have a job, face an ex-
ogenous probability of job termination. We then introduce heterogeneous wage expectations.
Based on the ￿ndings of the survey studies, we assume that the median searcher has the
correct expectation, and other searchers￿expectations are distributed symmetrically around
his. Each searcher now has his own reservation wage. Therefore, each individual has his own
steady-state unemployment rate (the steady-state probability of unemployment for a given
period). Computing the average individual unemployment rate, we obtain an expression for
the aggregate unemployment rate under heterogeneous wage expectations.
Subsequently, we investigate the relationship between the aggregate unemployment rate
and the dispersion of wage expectations. Intuitively, one might think that when expectations
become more dispersed, overall unemployment rises. After all, a very pessimistic searcher has
a very low reservation wage and is likely to accept the next job o⁄er. Pessimists have a lower
bound on their search duration: it asymptotes to one period. Optimists, on the other hand,
do not face a similar upper bound. There is an asymmetry between underestimating and over-
estimating wages. This drives convexity from expected wages to individuals￿unemployment
rates. Such a convexity, in turn, implies that average unemployment rises in dispersion. In
fact, mathematically we can identify one term that represents this convexity.
14Another recent empirical contribution applying survey data on wage expectations is Filippin and Ichino
(2004). They use data gathered from University of Bocconi students to investigate the relationship between
the expected and realized gender wage gap. We refer to Botelho and Pinto (2004) for a useful survey of the
empirical literature on wage expectations.
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There are several e⁄ects relating to the shape of the true wage-o⁄er distribution that can go
in the opposite direction. In two propositions we prove the existence of distributions for which
aggregate unemployment unambiguously increases in the dispersion of expected wages, and
distributions for which it unambiguously decreases.
To make further inroads, we turn to numerics. We calibrate the model on US and Ger-
man unemployment. We work with a standard lognormal distribution and, specifying the
discount rate and the job separation rate, we impute its shape parameter. We then introduce
heterogeneous wage expectations. Moreover, the results of the survey studies allow us to de-
￿ne upper bounds on the degree of heterogeneity (upper bounds because students are likely
the least informed labor market participants). As heterogeneity rises from zero to the upper
bound, unemployment continuously increases. Thus, for relevant parameter values, aggregate
unemployment unambiguously increases in the dispersion of wage expectations.
This leads to a policy implication: unemployment can be reduced through a better dissem-
ination of wage information. Career counseling among students, for instance, which generally
focusses on helping students in knowing what jobs to look for and where (reducing frictions),
could also focus on improving students￿knowledge of the wages they can expect.
We apply a di⁄erent numerical exercise to assess the size of potential gains from better
wage information. We match the current unemployment rate to the model with heteroge-
neous wage expectations, for di⁄erent degrees of heterogeneity. We then compute how much
unemployment decreases as wage expectations converge. For instance, for the US, if the 90th
percentile of searchers overestimate the true expected wage by 10% and the 10th percentile
underestimate it by 10%, better wage information could reduce unemployment by up to 0.5
percentage points. That is, for a degree of dispersion far below those in the survey studies,
1 out of 10 unemployed in the US are jobless because of the dispersion of expected wages.
Hence, the model predicts that the e⁄ect of heterogeneous wage expectations on unemploy-
ment is sizeable.
Our paper relates to the literature on search when the true wage-o⁄er distribution is
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rather a representative searcher who learns about the distribution by observing wage o⁄ers.
Rothschild (1974) was ￿rst to investigate whether the reservation wage property also holds
under Bayesian learning. He proved that it does, but only under particular assumptions about
the prior (Dirichlet distribution). Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996) generalize Rothschild￿ s
result.15 Contrary to this literature, our paper abstracts from learning, in order to focus on
the e⁄ect of aggregating over heterogeneous agents. Adam (2001) provides a discussion of
several studies in search theory that abstract from learning in order to focus on a di⁄erent
aspect, such as distinguishable search alternatives.
Theoretical analysis
In this section we analytically investigate the relationship between unemployment and het-
erogeneous wage expectations. We start from a standard representative-agent search model,
which includes job separation, and derive an expression for the equilibrium unemployment
rate. Subsequently, we allow for heterogeneous searchers who di⁄er in their wage expecta-
tions, and consider the implications.
The representative-agent model
Our exposition of the representative-agent search model follows that in Sargent and Ljungqvist
(2004). An in￿netely-lived, risk-neutral, unemployed worker gets a wage o⁄er, w, each period,
which is drawn from a time-invariant cumulative density function, F(w), on the support [0;1).
The worker can reject the o⁄er, in which case he is allowed to draw another o⁄er, w0, next
period. Alternatively, he can accept the o⁄er and work at wage w until he is ￿red. On every
job he faces the same ￿xed probability, ￿ 2 (0;1), each period of being ￿red.16
15Other contributions in this ￿eld include Burdett and Viswanath (1988) and Dubra (2004).
16We abstract from quitting as it makes no qualitative di⁄erence. As formally shown by Sargent and
Ljungqvist (2004, pp. 140-141), a worker will never voluntarily quit a job that pays him more than his
reservation wage. Moreover, we do not consider unemployment bene￿ts or search costs, as they are not
essential to our analysis.
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tyt if the worker has o⁄er w in hand. Here, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor.
If the searcher rejects the current wage o⁄er w, he gets the option to make a new draw next
period, which has value V (w) = ￿
R 1
0 V (w0)f(w0)dw0. But if he accepts the current o⁄er he
gets








0 + (1 ￿ ￿)V (w)
￿






1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
Hence, the searcher￿ s maximization problem becomes:


















The reservation wage, w, is the wage o⁄er for which the searcher is indi⁄erent between ac-
cepting and rejecting. Equating both sides in the max operator and solving gives:
w =
￿




0 ￿ w)f (w
0)dw
0 (35)
When the distribution F is determined and ￿ and ￿ are parameterized, this equation can be
solved numerically for w.






where q is the job creation rate. Here, the job creation rate equals the probability of accepting








Instead of a representative agent who knows the true wage-o⁄er distribution, F(w), we now
consider searchers with heterogeneous wage expectations. Each searcher has his own subjec-
tive distribution, Gi(w), and associated expected wage, E [w0 j Gi]. We make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 E [w0 j Gi] are distributed symmetrically around the true expected wage E [w0 j F].
This assumption is founded on the empirical results in the survey studies cited before.
The median searcher is unbiased. What we are interested in is the relationship between the
equilibrium unemployment rate, U, and the dispersion of expected wages. Hence, we consider
what happens to unemployment when the median wage expectation remains the same (at
E [w0 j F]), but the degree of heterogeneity of searchers￿wage expectations rises. That is,
when the dispersion of E [w0 j Gi] around E [w0 j F] increases. Let us de￿ne ￿ as a measure
of dispersion of E [w0 j Gi]. For instance, ￿ = V AR[E [w0 j Gi]], or ￿ is the ratio of the 90th
to the 10th percentile of expected wages, as reported in the survey studies. Our aim is to
understand @U
@￿.
We require a new expression for U, however. One that takes account of searchers￿hetero-
geneity. Each searcher now has his own reservation wage, wi. This means that each searcher
has an individual equilibrium unemployment rate, which we call Ui. This unemployment rate
is the steady-state probability that a worker is unemployed in a given period. After all, an
individual is either employed or unemployed in a given period. Thus, with the transition
probabilities into and out of work we can obtain an expression for the steady-state probability
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By the properties of an average, however, we can work directly with Ui. If we ￿nd, for instance,
that Ui is increasing and convex in E [w0 j Gi], then the average Ui will rise when E [w0 j Gi]
become more dispersed: @U
@￿ > 0.
Understanding the relationship between aggregate unemployment and the dispersion of
wage expectations thus becomes a matter of taking ￿rst and second derivatives.
dUi














dE [w0 j Gi]
(39)




That is, searchers with higher expected wages set higher reservation wages. This assump-
tion involves implicit restrictions on the variance (and higher moments) of the distributions
Gi(w0). The next example illustrates this point:
Example 1 Imagine there are two searchers. Searcher 1 has subjective wage distribution G1
which is uniform on [5;15], while searcher 2 has G2 which is uniform on [8:1;12:5]. Let us
take parameter values, ￿ = 0:95 and ￿ = 0:025. Then E [w j G1] = 10 < E [w j G2] = 10:3 but
by equation (35), w1 = 10:9 > w2 = 9:9. This is due to the larger variance of G1.
Assumption 2 thus implies that if searcher i has a higher expected wage than searcher
j, then the variance under Gi(w0) is either at least as large as that under Gj(w0) or, if not,
it is not so much smaller that wi > wj is violated. As an empirical matter, very little is
known about the variance of subjective wage distributions. The only study we know of that
investigates this is Dominitz and Manski (1997). They ￿nd that, on average, people with
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agreement with Assumption 2.
Naturally, by equation (39) and Assumption 2 we have that
dUi
dE[w0jGi] > 0. Hence, a searcher
with a higher wage expectation has a higher individual unemployment rate. This says nothing
yet about how the dispersion of wage expectations a⁄ects unemployment. For that, we need
to analyze the second derivative.
d2Ui
dE [w0 j Gi]
2 =
dUi
















The ￿rst term in parentheses is very intuitive. Abstracting from the other terms, the ￿rst
term implies that an individual￿ s unemployment rate is strictly convex in his expected wage.
Imagine a very pessimistic searcher. He will almost certainly accept the next job o⁄er he
receives. His search duration is bounded from below. Hence the unemployment duration of
pessimists asymptotes towards one period. Optimists, on the other hand, face no such upper
bound. Therefore, there is an asymmetry between underestimating wages and overestimating
wages, which drives the convexity.
The second and third term inside the brackets are more subtle to interpret. The second
term relates to the slope of the probability distribution function. Where the density function
is downward sloping, this term works against the convexity implied by the ￿rst term. Though
a higher expected wage implies a higher reservation wage, the extent to which this higher
reservation wage translates into higher unemployment depends on f(w0). At a point where it
slopes steeply downwards, a rise in the reservation wage implies only a small loss in the total
area of the distribution above wi. And, therefore, a small increase in unemployment. The
third term, moreover, relates to the convexity/concavity of the reservation wage in expected
wages, about which we have made no assumptions. Overall, we cannot make a statement
about the sign of
d2Ui
dE[w0jGi]2 that will hold true for all distributions. But, instead, we establish
two benchmark results. Firstly:
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d2Ui
dE[w0jGi]2 > 0 holds over the
entire support. Hence, for some distributions the aggregate unemployment rate unambiguously
increases in the dispersion of wage expectations: @U
@￿ > 0.
And, secondly:
Proposition III.2 There exist distributions, F(w0), for which
d2Ui
dE[w0jGi]2 < 0 over at least some
subset [a;b] of the support. Hence, cases can be constructed for which a marginal increase in the
dispersion of expected wages leads to a decrease in the aggregate unemployment rate: @U
@￿ < 0.
Proofs can be found in the appendix. These propositions establish that heterogeneity of
wage expectations could, in principle, a⁄ect aggregate unemployment either way. In order
to gain a deeper insight into the way the dispersion of wage expectations is likely to a⁄ect
unemployment, we need to consider a realistic parameterization. This allows us to assess not
only the sign, but also the size of the e⁄ect.
Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model. Speci￿cally, we propose the following numerical exercise.
First, we calibrate a completely standard homogeneous-expectations search model on the
current unemployment rate in the United States and Germany. Subsequently, we introduce
heterogeneous wage expectations. We then analyze the sign of the relationship between the
dispersion of expected wages and unemployment, and estimate the quantitative impact of
reducing the dispersion of wage expectations through better wage information.
Standard model
We want to calibrate equations (35) and (36) such that UUS equals the unemployment rate
of the US: 5:0% in June 2005 according to OECD Statistics, while by the same source for
Germany UDE = 9:5%. We require parameter values for the discount rate, the job separation
rate and a functional form for f(w0).
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In a comprehensive survey on rates of time preference, Frederick et al. (2002) give an overview
of the results of estimating discount rates from 42 di⁄erent studies. Though the variation in
results is very large, the median study ￿nds an annual rate of time preference of around 0:90.
However, we do not know how long a period is in calender time in our model. But using
data from the US BLS and the German Statistisches Bundesamt we have an indication for
job arrival rates. For instance, for the US we already have
unemployed
labour force = 0:05. Next, the
BLS reports the ratio
new job openings
employed , which for the ￿rst half of 2005 stands at around 3.5%
per month. Taking these two together, plus the equation that employed + unemployed =
labour force, we compute
new job openings
unemployed = 0:665. We call this the monthly probability of
receiving a job o⁄er. This is of course rather rough, since job-to-job transitions and structural
unemployment are implicitly assumed away. This is consistent with our model, however.
Finally, given the monthly probability of receiving an o⁄er, p, we can compute the average
number of months until a job o⁄er is received as follows: Average[N] =
P1
N=1 Np[1 ￿ p]
N￿1.
For the US, the average number of months till a job o⁄er is 1.5. By similar computation it
stands at 10 months for Germany. These are the periods that we have in the model: from one
job o⁄er to the next. If ￿ = 0:90 is taken as the yearly discount rate, then ￿DE t 0:915 and
￿US t 0:985.
The job separation rate
Data from the German Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (see Bachmann (2005))
indicate that in Germany the job separation rate is around 0.63% per month. It should be
noted though, that the German ￿gures are for all types of job separation, not only layo⁄s
which is what ￿ essentially stands for. The US BLS reports ￿gures by cause of separation.
The layo⁄ rate stands at about 1.2% a month in 2005. For the period lengths found above,
these ￿gures translate into ￿DE = (1:0063)
10 ￿ 1 = 0:065 and ￿US = (1:012)
1:5 ￿ 1 = 0:018.
Below we perform sensitivity tests for both ￿ and ￿.
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We choose to work with the lognormal distribution, as it is generally considered a good ap-
proximation of empirical wage distributions (see, for instance, Dominitz and Manski (1996,














with w > 0 and ￿ > 0. Hence the standard lognormal distribution has only a shape parameter,
￿. Equations (35) and (36) become:
w =
￿





































Given U, ￿ and ￿ we can impute ￿ using the two equations above. This is the advantage
of using a standard lognormal distribution: since it is a one parameter distribution, we can
impute a unique value for the free parameter. For the given parameters we impute ￿US = 0:135
and ￿DE = 0:235. It is not remarkable that the imputed ￿￿ s di⁄er considerably for the US
and Germany, because the periods are di⁄erent: it is likely that the wage-o⁄er distribution
of an individual who receives an o⁄er every 1.5 months is di⁄erent from that of someone who
receives an o⁄er every 10 months.
Model with heterogeneous wage expectations
Using the parameter values above, we now want to understand how unemployment is a⁄ected
when job searchers have di⁄erent wage expectations. We need a way, however, to translate
individuals￿expected wages into reservation wages. One possibility would be to make an
assumption about the shape of all Gi. Instead, we prefer to keep the calibration￿ s predictions
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wages.
Obtaining estimates of the elasticity
A few studies have estimated the elasticity of the reservation wage to the expected wage.
There are two ways to do this. Jones (1989) estimates an OLS equation for the UK in which
he regresses the log reservation wage on, among other variables, the log past wage of the
unemployed searcher. He takes the past wage as a proxy for the mean of the individual-
speci￿c wage distribution. This may seem like a rather rough procedure, but in a recent
study Hogan (2004) uses a di⁄erent method and has very close results to those of Jones.
Hogan uses data from the British Household Panel Survey to test for the determinants of
reservation wages. One of his regressors is the mean of the individual-speci￿c distribution of
wage o⁄ers. He constructs this mean by an estimation on variables that re￿ ect a person￿ s
characteristics in terms of human capital and household composition. In the second step, the
log reservation wage is regressed on, among other variables, the log mean of the individual-
speci￿c wage distribution. Both Jones and Hogan ￿nd (highly signi￿cant) elasticities in the
range 0:25 ￿ 0:29 for the UK.
Using Jones￿method, Christensen (2001) estimates this elasticity for Germany at ￿DE =
0:46. Another estimate by Addison et al. (2004) for the EU-15 minus Sweden and Luxemburg
gives a fairly similar result, with an elasticity of 0:41. For the US we are aware of only one
such estimate, again following Jones (1989), by Haurin and Sridhar (2003), ￿US = 0:64.17 We
use the estimates by Christensen (2001) and Haurin and Sridhar (2003) for our calibration.
The distribution of wage expectations
Assumption 1 states that E [w0 j Gi] are distributed symmetrically around the true expected
wage E [w0 j F]. In fact, using the above elasticities we have a linear transformation of expected
wages into reservation wages, so that we can directly write wi = w + "i where w is the
17From Jones (2002) we do have an estimate of this elasticity for Canada at 0:59.
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with mean zero. Call h("i) the distribution of "i. This distribution requires a functional form
in our calibration. We set h("i) s N (0;￿2
"). However, we need to determine a cuto⁄ to
avoid negative reservation wages. We set the cuto⁄at 3 standard deviations, "i 2 [￿3￿";3￿"],
which, as an empirical matter, is nearly equivalent to "i 2 [￿1;1], as it includes 99:73% of
the distribution. We now have the following expression for the aggregate unemployment rate,



































Measuring the degree of dispersion
We have values for all parameters in the expression above, except for ￿". However, from the
papers by Betts (1996), Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Brunello et al. (2001) we have point
estimates for a measure of heterogeneity of wage expectations. This measure is the ratio of
the 90th against the 10th percentile of respondents, ranked by expected wages. We let "::th
refer to the ..th percentile. Then, ￿ =
E[wjGi=G"90th]
E[wjGi=G"10th] denotes the ratio we have from the survey
studies, which from both Betts (1996) and Dominitz and Manski (1996) is about ￿ = 2 for
the US, while from Brunello et al. (2001) it is around ￿ = 3:2 for Germany. These estimates
for ￿ allow us to obtain an upper bound on ￿". The reason they constitute an upper bound
is that the surveys were conducted among students, who are likely to possess less information
than experienced labour market participants.




E [w j Gi = G"90th] ￿ E [w j Gi = G"10th]
E [w j Gi = G"10th]
= ￿ (￿ ￿ 1) (45)
where ￿ is the elasticity of reservation wages to expected wages. By w("i) = w+"i, moreover,
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"90th ￿ "10th
w + "10th
= ￿ (￿ ￿ 1) (46)
Secondly, in our symmetric setup, where the 50th percentile is the median searcher for which
"50th = 0,
"90th + "10th = 0 (47)
And since h("i) s N (0;￿2
") then by the tables of the normal distribution
"90th ￿ "10th = 2(1:28)￿" (48)






￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
2 + ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
(49)
So for the US calibration, for instance, we consider ￿" for ￿ 2 [1;2], because ￿ = 1 is
the minimum (implying homogeneous wage expectations) and ￿ = 2 is the upper bound on
heterogeneity.
Calibration results
The numerical exercise we conduct is to compute for the relevant range of ￿, the di⁄erence
between unemployment in equation (44) and unemployment in equation (43). That is, the
di⁄erence between unemployment when searchers have heterogeneous wage expectations and
the unemployment when they have homogeneous wage expectations. The latter we matched to
the actual unemployment rate. Call this di⁄erence ￿U. Our results are reported in the tables
below. In these tables ￿U is expressed in terms of percentage points. So, for instance, for the
United States if ￿ = 1:2 then the unemployment rate with heterogeneous wage expectations,
is 5:47%, an increase of 0:47% over the actual US unemployment rate. Hence the entry 0:47
at ￿U￿=1:2 in the ￿rst row of Table I. The rows below give an indication of the sensitivity of
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[Insert Tables I and II here]
The results consistently indicate that unemployment is rising in the dispersion of wage
expectations. Hence, though Propositions 1 and 2 formally proved ambiguity in the general
case, in the calibration the outcome is unambiguous.
The size of the e⁄ect
The above results do not tell us how much policy-makers could potentially reduce unemploy-
ment by improving information about wages in the economy. Instead, we can turn the exercise
upside down and obtain a quantitative outcome. We match the expression in equation (44) to
the actual unemployment rate, and compute how much unemployment falls as ￿ ! 1. That
is, assuming we live in a world where people di⁄er in their wage expectations, we can ask how
much unemployment could be reduced if suddenly all expectations converged to the unbiased
median. This provides an upper bound on unemployment reduction due to better wage in-





= 5:0%. This turns out to be ￿ = 0:133. Then we can compute for ￿ ! 1
that the model predicts that unemployment goes to 4:47%. Hence, the maximum reduction
in unemployment due to better wage information is 0:53% in this case. Table III reports the
maximum unemployment reduction due to better wage information for di⁄erent values of ￿,
given the same ￿ and ￿ as before.
[Insert Table III here]
Unfortunately, we cannot compute beyond ￿ = 1:2 for the US and ￿ = 2 for Germany.
The reason is that for high values of ￿ there no longer exists a ￿ that matches the current
unemployment rate.18 However, already for the relatively low values of ￿ in Table III, the
18For instance, when ￿ = 1:3, ￿ = 0:985 and ￿ = 0:018, then in equation (44) UUS > 5:0 even as ￿ ! 0. This
happens because for low values of ￿, UUS becomes almost irresponsive to further reductions. The reservation
wage then asymptotes towards a lower bound, in this case w ! 0:967.
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expectations. For instance, ￿ = 1:2 means that the 90th percentile of searchers overestimate
the true expected wage by 10% and the 10th percentile underestimate it by 10%. But already
for this relatively small degree of heterogeneity, 1 out of 10 unemployed in the US is jobless
because of the dispersion of expected wages. Hence, the calibrated model suggests that the
potential for unemployment reduction due to a better dissemination of wage information is
rather large.
Conclusions
Motivated by survey studies￿￿ndings that wage expectations are widely dispersed, we have
considered the e⁄ects of heterogeneous expectations about wages on unemployment. We
extended a standard search model to include heterogeneous wage expectations. Dispersed
wage expectations have an ambiguous e⁄ect on unemployment. On the one hand, search
duration of pessimists converges to a lower bound, whereas optimists face no upper bound on
their search duration. There is an asymmetry between underestimating and overestimating
wages. This would imply a higher unemployment rate for wider dispersion. On the other
hand, there are subtle e⁄ects related to the shape of the wage-o⁄er distribution, which can, in
principle, overturn the positive relationship between the dispersion of wage expectations and
unemployment.
In order to assess what the relationship looks like for relevant parameter values, we cali-
brated the model on US and German unemployment. Not only does greater dispersion of wage
expectations now unambiguously increase unemployment, but the e⁄ect is sizeable. For dis-
persion levels far below those reported in survey studies, a considerable part of unemployment
is due to dispersed wage expectations.
Our results advocate e⁄orts to improve the dissemination of information about wages.
Career counseling among students, for instance, which generally focusses on helping students
in knowing what jobs to look for and where (reducing frictions), could also focus on improving
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of a culture that fosters greater openness about wages may be helpful, especially in Europe,
where there tends to be a culture that does not promote the exchange of knowledge about
wages.
This paper is the ￿rst to explore the relationship between heterogeneous wage expectations
and unemployment. For this reason, it started from the most basic setting. Embedding
expectations dispersion in a richer structure, including learning or an endogenous ￿rm side, is
left for future research.
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Appendix A. Microfoundations of Chapter I
This appendix presents a general model that matches properties P1-P3. To do so the following
elements will prove su¢ cient:
1. There are trade imbalances.
2. There is full specialization in production.
3. Tari⁄s can a⁄ect the terms-of-trade.
4. There are gains from trade.
Before presenting the formal derivation, we explain intuitively how these elements lead to
properties P1-P3. Trade imbalances in conjunction with the ability to a⁄ect terms-of-trade
lead to P1: the larger a country￿ s trade de￿cit is, the more it loses more from giving up
the ability to in￿ uence its import prices. When, in addition, there are gains from trade, P2
obtains, because there is a trade-o⁄between the gains from trade and the losses from yielding
independent tari⁄ setting. Beyond a threshold trade de￿cit, losses exceed gains. Finally, full
specialization and the ability to a⁄ect terms-of trade together bring about P3. The reason is
that when two countries sign an agreement to cut bilateral tari⁄s, they raise the price of each
other￿ s export goods. Given that the third country does not produce these goods itself, but
imports them, the agreement makes it worse o⁄.
Thus, we present a model that contains these four elements and microfounds our one-shot
game. The model has two periods. In the ￿rst period there are country-speci￿c income shocks
and consumers smooth consumption through international borrowing and lending. When a
country borrows from abroad, it purchases more than it sells, and is in trade de￿cit. Upon
repayment of the debt it must generate a trade surplus. This is a standard approach to
modelling imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996)). Subsequently, in the second period, the
trade negotiation game described in Figure 2 takes place.
Intertemporal preferences
As is common in the literature on trade imbalances, preferences over the intertemporal allo-
cation of consumption expenditure and preferences over the intratemporal allocation of goods
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by U (Ct
i) where Ct
i is country i￿ s total consumption expenditure in period t. We do not need










intertemporal preferences are concave. This bring about the incentive to smooth consumption



















where ￿ is the discount rate. Income in the periods is given by
Y
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is an income component that
depends on consumption decisions in country i and abroad. It includes producer pro￿ts and
tari⁄revenues. Finally, ￿t
i is the country-speci￿c income shock with ￿t=1
i being independently
and identically distributed across countries, while ￿t=2
i = 0 for all countries.
To smooth income shocks consumers are allowed to buy and sell an internationally traded











i + (1 + r)Bi (A.4)
The bond is the only internationally traded asset. Financial market clearing requires that r
adjusts so as to obtain X
i
Bi = 0 (A.5)




























+ (1 + r)Bi
￿￿






. In fact, we assume
that governments play no role in the ￿rst period, and that ￿rst period tari⁄s are exogenously
given. Governments only play the negotiation game in period 2. By separating consumer and
government decisions over the two periods, much complexity is avoided. In the second period
governments take consumers￿￿rst period decision as given. And in the ￿rst period consumers
optimize taking into account the e⁄ect that their borrowing and lending has on second period
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dU
￿







Y + g (￿)













where the e⁄ect of the consumer￿ s ￿rst period decision on the outcome of the negotiation game





j 8j. That is, country i experiences a negative income shock relative




































and, therefore, Bi < 0 is optimal. Consumers in country i borrow in period 1 and repay in
period 2. Notice that it is the relative size of shocks that determines borrowing and lending
(￿t=1
i < ￿t=1
j ), not the absolute size (￿t=1
i 7 0). When, say, ￿t=1
i = ￿t=1
j 8j with ￿t=1
i < 0, no
borrowing and lending takes place, since all countries are in an identical position.
As trade negotiations occur in the second period, for ￿t=1
i < ￿t=1
j 8j country i would be in
the position of country Z in our one-shot game. Likewise, when ￿t=1
i > ￿t=1
j 8j then country i
is in the position of country X during trade negotiations.
Therefore, borrowing in the ￿rst period implies a weaker negotiation position in the second
period (since country Z is the least favoured partner). Likewise, ￿rst period lending can
bestow bene￿ts beyond interest payment. This, of course, is factored into consumers￿optimal
borrowing and lending (through d
dBig (￿)
t=2) and hence into market clearing interest rates.
Intratemporal preferences
The intertemporal decision determines how much the domestic consumer spends on consump-











ik is the consumption in country i of good k at time t, and pt
ik is that good￿ s price.
Intratemporal utility over the consumption of the goods, u(ct
ik), does not require a particular







Agur, Itai (2008), Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations 
European University Institute
 










This will ensure that countries￿relative market power over di⁄erent product markets can be
expressed in terms of di⁄erences in consumption shares only.
Production
Producers in each country produce one good only, which is made nowhere else. Thus, each
country exports one good and imports two, i.e., there is full specialization. We denote by ct
ij
and pt
ij the consumption and price in country i of country j￿ s export good. Likewise, ct
ii and
pt
ii are the domestic consumption and domestic price of the locally produced good.
Production is subject to decreasing returns to scale and perfect competition. Denote by
Qt
























The di⁄erence between the local price of an import good and the price in its country of origin,
pt
ij ￿ pt

















ij > 0. We can show,



























= + + ￿+ < 0 (A.13)
which means that tari⁄s a⁄ect the terms-of-trade. Terms-of-trade can be written as the
number of goods country i can import with the proceeds from one of its goods being exported,
pt
ii=pt
jj (ex-tari⁄ price of exports over ex-tari⁄ price of imports). Thus, a higher tari⁄ of i on
64
Agur, Itai (2008), Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26061j implies that country j￿ s exports become cheaper, and its terms-of-trade worsen, while those
of country i improve.










￿ < 0 (A.14)
The greater the fraction a country consumes of a foreign good, ct
ij=Qt
j, the greater the ability
to depress its price with import tari⁄s.
We assume, moreover, that governments make optimal use of this market power when
they set tari⁄s (which only happens when negotiations conclude without an agreement in the























￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
RTAij = 2￿t
(A.15)
When one country has greater in￿ uence over terms-of-trade than another country, it has lower
terms-of-trade under bilateral free trade than under non-cooperation.
Results
Properties P1-P3 are written in terms of welfare. To link statements about terms-of-trade to








￿ > 0 (A.16)
That is, a country￿ s welfare is increasing in its terms-of-trade.
Moreover, by downward sloping demand and upward sloping supply from equations (A.8)
















RTAij = 2￿t (A.17)
and tari⁄ elimination raises joint welfare.
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equation (A.15), de￿cit country i su⁄ers a terms-of-trade loss from signing an agreement. It
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which is P1. Thus, a country faces a trade-o⁄between the e¢ ciency gains from an agreement















so that by equation (A.20) there exists some TB
t

















This is P2. Finally, RTAj6=i implies that countries j 6= i cut tari⁄s on each other￿ s goods,
which raises mutual consumption of each other￿ s goods and pt
















RTAj6=i= 2￿t < 0 (A.23)
and
TBijjRTAj6=i2￿t ￿ TBijjRTAj6=i= 2￿t < 0 (A.24)
which matches P3.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Applying backward induction, we consider ￿rst the outcome of
RTA negotiations and then that of MTA negotiations. Below is country X￿ s payo⁄ matrix
during RTA negotiations:
X￿ s actions: Other players￿actions:
RTAY Z 2 ￿ RTAY Z = 2 ￿
Reject both WXj￿=fRTAY Zg WXj￿=f;g
Accept only RTAXY WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAY Zg WXj￿=fRTAXY g
Accept only RTAXZ WXj￿=fRTAXZ;RTAY Zg WXj￿=fRTAXZg
Accept both WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAXZg
where it is implicit that whenever X accepts RTAXY or RTAXZ, Y or Z accept it too. This
follows from P1 and P2: TBij (￿) > 0 > TBij. While by initial imbalances, TBXZ (￿)j￿=f;g <
TBXY (￿)j￿=f;g < 0 and fromP3, TBXYjRTAY Z2￿￿TBXYjRTAY Z = 2￿ < 0 and TBXZjRTAY Z2￿￿
TBXZjRTAY Z = 2￿ < 0 country X is in bilateral de￿cit against Y and Z regardless of the actions
of Y and Z against each other. Thus, irrespective of whether RTAY Z 2 ￿ or RTAY Z = 2 ￿,
the RTAs that country X accepts are always signed.
Now, consider the case when TBXZ (￿)j￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg ￿ TBXZ and TBXY (￿)j￿=fRTAY Zg ￿
TBXY hold (point 1 in Proposition 1). P2 in conjunction with TBXZ (￿)j￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg ￿
TBXZ gives
WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg > WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAY Zg
which, in turn, implies that
WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg > WXj￿=fRTAXZ;RTAY Zg
Likewise, P2 together with TBXY (￿)j￿=fRTAY Zg ￿ TBXY gives
WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAY Zg > WXj￿=fRTAY Zg
Hence, when Y and Z accept RTAY Z, then ￿ = fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg achieves maxi-
mum welfare for country X and the action "Accept both" is optimal. However, by P3, the
above welfare rankings directly imply
WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZg > WXj￿=fRTAXY g
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WXj￿=fRTAXY g > WXj￿=f;g
Therefore, "Accept both" is X￿ s dominant strategy (i.e. optimal regardless of whether Y and
Z accept RTAY Z).
Moreover, whenever X is willing to accept RTAXZ then, by TBXZ (￿)j￿=f;g < TBY Z (￿)j￿=f;g <
0, Y is also willing to accept RTAY Z (as is Z, by P2). Hence, during RTA negotiations all
RTAs are accepted. Then, during the preceding MTA negotiations, countries face the choice
between ￿ = fMTAg if all accept the MTA and ￿ = fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg if the MTA
is rejected. Since both imply world free trade Wij￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg = Wij￿=fMTAg 8i
and by the tie-breaking assumption the MTA is accepted by all. This proves point 1 in
Proposition 1.
Next, consider the case that for all i with TBij < 0 it holds that TBij (￿) < TBij8￿ (point
3 in Proposition 1). During RTA negotiations for each country pair there is one country (i
with TBij < 0) that rejects the RTA, regardless of other countries￿actions (8￿). Hence, RTA
negotiations have ￿ = f;g as the outcome. At the preceding MTA negotiations, countries
thus choose between ￿ = fMTAg and ￿ = f;g. Here, country X certainly rejects MTA. This
follows from the fact that TBXj (￿) < TBXj8￿ implies
WXj￿=f;g > WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAXZg
and, by P3,
WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAXZg > WXj￿=fRTAXY ;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg
so that by WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg = WXj￿=fMTAg we have
WXj￿=f;g > WXj￿=fMTAg
and country X rejects the MTA. Thus, the outcome of trade negotiations is ￿ = f;g which
proves point 3 in Proposition 1.
Finally, when trade balances do not satisfy the conditions in either point 1 or point 3 of
Proposition 1, then not all RTAs are accepted, nor are all RTAs rejected. The outcome is
either ￿ = fRTAXYg or ￿ = fRTAY Zg or ￿ = fRTAXY;RTAY Zg. By TBXZ (￿)j￿=f;g <
TBXY (￿)j￿=f;g < 0 and TBXZ (￿)j￿=f;g < TBY Z (￿)j￿=f;g < 0, if any RTA is rejected, then
RTAXZ is rejected by country X. When RTAXZ is rejected, it holds that
WXj￿=fMTAg = WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg < WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg
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WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg < WXj￿=fRTAXY g
so that, regardless of whether Y and Z sign RTAY Z, X achieves higher welfare without the
MTA. Thus, when X rejects any RTA it also rejects the MTA.
It remains to show that all three regionalist equilibria, ￿ = fRTAXYg, ￿ = fRTAY Zg and
￿ = fRTAXY;RTAY Zg, exist. Three examples su¢ ce. Take TBXZ (￿)j￿=fRTAXY g < TBXZ,
TBXY (￿)j￿=f;g ￿ TBXY and TBY Z (￿)j￿=fRTAXY g < TBY Z. By P3,
TBY Z (￿)j￿=fRTAXY g = max
￿
fTBY Z (￿)g
Hence, Y ￿ s dominant strategy is "Accept only RTAXY". Similarly, X is always best o⁄
rejecting RTAXZ. Thus, by TBXY (￿)j￿=f;g ￿ TBXY we have that ￿ = fRTAXYg results.
When, instead, TBXY (￿)j￿=f;g < TBXY, TBXZ (￿)j￿=fRTAXY g < TBXZ and TBY Z (￿)j￿=f;g ￿
TBY Z then X￿ s dominant strategy is "Reject both", and, given X￿ s response, Y accepts
RTAY Z (as does Z). Therefore, ￿ = fRTAY Zg results.
When TBXY (￿)j￿=fRTAY Zg ￿ TBXY, TBXZ (￿)j￿=fRTAY Zg < TBXZ and TBY Z (￿)j￿=fRTAXZg ￿
TBY Z then by P3
TBY Z (￿)j￿=fRTAY Zg = min
￿
fTBY Z (￿)g
and Y ￿ s dominant strategy is "Accept both". Given this action, X￿ s best response is "Accept
only RTAXY", leading to ￿ = fRTAXY;RTAY Zg.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the Proof of Proposition 1, whenever country X accepts an
agreement, then so do other countries. Furthermore, by P3, when WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg >
WXj￿=fMTAg ￿ WXj￿=f;g then
WXj￿=fRTAXY g > WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg > WXj￿=fMTAg ￿ WXj￿=f;g
and, therefore, in the standard Game it is the dominant strategy for X to reject the MTA dur-
ing multilateral negotiations. But in the No-Regionalism Game X is left with WXj￿=fMTAg ￿
WXj￿=f;g and accepts the MTA. This proves point 1.
Similarly, by P3
WXj￿=fRTAXY g > WXj￿=fRTAXY;RTAY Zg ￿ WXj￿=f;g > WXj￿=fMTAg
holds for the setting in point 2. Hence, in the No-Regionalism Game X rejects the MTA,
leading to ￿ = f;g. But in the standard Game X rejects the MTA, while playing dominant
strategy "Accept RTAXY" during RTA negotiations. Hence, in the standard Game ￿ = f;g
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Proof of Proposition 3. We ￿rst prove the statement in point 1 and, subsequently, the







ij￿t=fRTAijg ￿ W t
ij￿t=fMTAg
i
8t > 1) lead to one of the three equilibrium paths described
in the statement of Proposition 3. Therefore, these equilibrium paths are the only ones that
exist, and Proposition 3 is proven.
As described in the text, in the ￿rst period initial trade balances are as in the one-
shot game: TBt=1
XZ (￿t=1)j￿t=1=f;g < TBt=1
XY (￿t=1)j￿t=1=f;g < 0 and TBt=1
XZ (￿t=1)j￿t=1=f;g <
TBt=1
Y Z (￿t=1)j￿t=1=f;g < 0. However, balanced trade is restored afterwards: TBt
ij (￿t) =
08i;j;￿;t > 1.
We prove point 1 by showing that when
h
W t
ij￿t=fRTAijg ￿ W t
ij￿t=fMTAg
i
￿ 08t > 1 then:
a) for t > 1 world free trade (MTA) always obtains; b) in period 1 the MTA is signed only
when imbalances are as in point 1 of Proposition 1. Given a) and b), for small enough ￿rst
period imbalances the MTA holds from period 1 onwards (Good Path), and if imbalances are
larger, then there is temporary regionalism (Ugly Path).
Consider a). By assumption: TBt
ij (￿t) = 08i;j;￿;t > 1 and hence balanced trade obtains
for t > 1. Given P3 and
h
W t
ij￿t=fRTAijg ￿ W t
ij￿t=fMTAg
i
￿ 08t > 1 country i has the following






















where ￿t = ffMTAg ￿ fRTAj6=igg stands for the structure that includes the two RTAs to










Given this ranking, during RTA negotiations country i accepts any RTA that it had not previ-
ously signed, regardless of whether RTAj6=i is in force. As this holds true for all countries, world
free trade always obtains for t > 1. That is, in period t = 2, ￿t = fRTAXY;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg
is known to be the outcome of RTA negotiations, and the MTA is accepted at the preceding
MTA negotiations (by the tie-breaking assumption).
Now, consider b). When ￿rst period imbalances satisfy the conditions in point 1 of Propo-
sition 1 then, by the Proof of Proposition 1, accepting the MTA is the best response viewed
from instantaneous welfare. Moreover, the period 1 decision has no e⁄ect on ￿ from period
2 onwards, which, by the above, is always MTA. Thus, the instantaneous-welfare maximizing
choice (MTA) is accepted by all in period 1.
When, instead, ￿rst period imbalances do not satisfy these conditions, country X is best
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doing so: regardless of ￿rst period structure, future structure is MTA. Gaining instantaneously,
but losing no welfare in the future, country X rejects the MTA in period 1. This completes
the proof of point b).
Next, we prove point 2. By P3 and
h
W t
ij￿t=fRTAijg ￿ W t
ij￿t=fMTAg
i
> 08t > 1 we again






















Consider the case that there is only one RTA, ￿t = fRTAijg. For instance, take ￿t =
fRTAXYg. Viewed from instantaneous welfare, "Accept RTAXZ" and "Accept RTAY Z" are
the dominant strategies for X and Y , respectively: W t
Xj￿t=fRTAXY ;RTAXZg > W t
Xj￿t=fRTAXY g
and W t
Xj￿t=fRTAXY ;RTAXZ;RTAY Zg > W t
Xj￿t=fRTAXY ;RTAY Zg, and likewise for Y . Thus, accept-
ing all RTAs (and, therefore, MTA at the preceding MTA negotiations) is a one-shot Nash
Equilibrium.
However, both X and Y are worse o⁄ under ￿t = fMTAg than under ￿t = fRTAXYg.
Therefore, they could play a Tit-for-Tat strategy whereby neither signs the RTA with Z as
long as the other does not do so either. If one country signs the RTA with Z, then the next
period the other country signs it too. Hence, ￿t = fRTAXYg is sustainable as long as the
instantaneous gains from signing the RTA with Z, given that the other does not, are smaller
than the subsequent losses from moving to world free trade. That is, given that all periods

























Thus, there is some ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for ￿ ￿ ￿ the Bad Path is sustainable. Of course, even
for ￿ ￿ ￿ this is not the only equilibrium. If one or both players do not follow a Tit-for-Tat
strategy, the MTA is signed. This proves point 2.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose not. Then there would not exist a distribution for
which
d2Ui
dE[w0jGi]2 > 0 holds over the entire support. A counterexample su¢ ces to show that
this cannot be true. Let F(w0) be the cumulative density function of a uniform distribution




2s and f(w0) = 1
2s.
Now, by equation (40) and f0(w0) = 0 we can state that
d2Ui




Putting f(w0) = 1
2s into equation (35) and solving, gives us
wi = E [w










s(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(s￿￿ + ￿E [w0 j Gi] + s)
and hence
@wi
@E [w0 j Gi]
= 1 ￿
s
s(1 + ￿￿) ￿ s￿




@E [w0 j Gi]
2 =
￿
2(s(1 + ￿￿) + ￿E [w0 j Gi])
s
s(1 + ￿￿) ￿ s￿




dE[w0jGi]2 > 0 holds.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is possible to construct distributions which are arbitrarily
strongly downward sloping over a part of the support. In particular, one can have f0 (wi) !
￿1 when part of a distribution approaches a vertical line. For f0 (wi) ! ￿1 other terms in
d2Ui




dE[w0jGi]2 depend on the











dE[w0jGi] does not go to zero for
f0 (wi) ! ￿1. Therefore, it is possible to obtain a distribution for which
d2Ui
dE[w0jGi]2 < 0 over
at least part of the support of F(w0).
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Table I: US, calibration results
￿ ￿ imputed ￿ ￿U￿=1:1 ￿U￿=1:2 ￿U￿=1:3 ￿U￿=1:5 ￿U￿=2
0:985 0:018 0:135 0:12 0:47 1:08 3:03 9:58
Sensitivity to ￿
0:98 0:018 0:155 0:08 0:34 0:77 2:14 7:25
0:99 0:018 0:117 0:15 0:66 1:54 4:34 12:42
Sensitivity to ￿
0:985 0:016 0:15 0:09 0:41 0:93 2:59 8:40
0:985 0:020 0:125 0:12 0:51 1:18 3:37 10:47
Table II: Germany, calibration results
￿ ￿ imputed ￿ ￿U￿=1:1 ￿U￿=1:2 ￿U￿=1:3 ￿U￿=1:5 ￿U￿=2 ￿U￿=3:2
0:915 0:065 0:235 0:00 0:04 0:11 0:34 1:23 4:19
Sensitivity to ￿
0:905 0:065 0:250 0:00 0:03 0:10 0:29 1:05 3:61
0:925 0:065 0:220 0:00 0:05 0:14 0:40 1:44 4:89
Sensitivity to ￿
0:915 0:06 0:256 0:00 0:03 0:10 0:31 1:11 3:76
0:915 0:07 0:213 0:00 0:05 0:13 0:38 1:37 4:71
Table III: Maximum unemployment reduction due to better wage information
US ￿ = 1:1 ￿ = 1:2
maximum unemployment reduction 0:11% 0:53%
imputed ￿ 0:133 0:118
Germany ￿ = 1:1 ￿ = 1:2 ￿ = 1:3 ￿ = 1:5 ￿ = 2
maximum unemployment reduction 0:00% 0:04% 0:11% 0:37% 1:82%
imputed ￿ 0:235 0:234 0:233 0:218 0:155
73
Agur, Itai (2008), Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/26061